This is a survey paper for non-specialists on interactions between energy and productivity growth. The first half of the paper surveys the general economic literature linking technical progress to realized gains in productivity growth. The second half of the survey focuses in particular on the important role of energy in linking technical progress to productivity growth, and contains an overview of a great deal of literature, both classic and recent.
INTRODUCTION
The relationships among technical progress, productivity growth and energy use are not only extremely important, but they are also exceedingly complex. It is not surprising, therefore, that these interactions can be viewed insightfully from a number of differing vantages. In this paper I survey the existing literature, as viewed by an economist.
The outline I follow is as follows: The first half of the paper surveys the general economic literature linking technical progress to realized gains in productivity growth. The second half of the survey focuses in particular on the important role of energy in linking technical progress to productivity growth.
More specifically, in Section II I consider the economic literature relating technical progress to various types of productivity growth, summarize the economic framework of cost and production, and distinguish embodied and disembodied technical progress. This section also contains a very brief overview on principal empirical findings to date. Then in Section III I narrow my focus and examine how energy consumption patterns simultaneously effect and are effected by technical progress and productivity growth. This section contains an overview of a great deal of literature, both classic and recent.
Finally, in Section IV I present concluding remarks and observations. Since this survey focuses on energy issues, I will of course overview the existing literature on the relationship between energy price shocks and the 1973-74 productivity growth slowdown. A number of interesting explanations for this slowdown have been offered that are essentially unrelated to energy issues (e.g., US government monetary and fiscal policy in 1973-75 allegedly was not accommodating), but due to space constraints, I will not discuss them here. 1 
II. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Ever since the pioneering research of Jan Tinbergen [1942] and Robert M. Solow [1957] , the relationships among technical progress and productivity growth -Page 2 -have been envisaged within the economic theory of cost and production. In the next few paragraphs, therefore, I present and summarize these theoretical foundations.
II.A. Cost and Production Functions
Define a set of engineering relationships among inputs and output as the production function, which indicates the maximum possible flow of output attainable (denoted Y), given alternative quantity flows of the n inputs (denoted X 1 ,X 2 ,...,Xn) and the state of technical knowledge (denoted A). Write this production function in impliicit form as Y = f(X 1 ,X 2 ,... ,X ;A).
(1)
A useful way of viewing the production function relationship is to think of it as a book whose pages contain alternative blueprint designs for combining inputs to produce the output level Y. Obviously, the production function and the book of blueprints must be consistent with laws of nature and other engineering relationships. While laws of nature are by definition stable and do not change over time, our understanding and discovery of these laws, as well as our ability to exploit technological possibilities, has improved with time. One way of accounting for such advances in the state of technical knowledge, therefore, is to think of them as adding new pages to the book of blueprints.
For this reason, the variable A is included in the production function (1).
It is often convenient to structure the relationships among technical progress and productivity growth in terms of the dual cost function. A cost function indicates the minimum possible total cost C of producing a given level of output, given prices of the n inputs (denoted P,P 2 .... Pn ) and the state of technical knowledge A. Write the cost function as C = g(P 1 ,P 2 ,... ", n;Y;A).
-Page 3 -Obviously, the form of the dual cost function g in (2) must reflect the parameters of technology embodied in the production function f of (1).
Moreover, it is important to note that advances in technical knowledge that shift outward the production function, shift downward the dual cost function.
II.B. Factor-Specific and Multifactor Productivity Growth
Early in this century when agriculture played a much larger role in the economy than it does in industrialized economies today, analysts typically identified the word productivity with average yield per acre, i.e. Y/X i , where Y was yield per year and X i was the number of acres. This focus in agricultural economics on yield per acre is but one example of factor-specific productivity.
Another example of factor-specific productivity, namely, average labor productivity, is more common today than is yield per acre. Average labor productivity is defined as Y/L --output divided by labor input --where labor input is typically measured as hours at work. On average since World War II, in both the European and North American economies, average labor productivity in the manufacturing sector has grown about 2% per year; in Japan the growth rate in labor productivity over the last two decades has averaged at 5% per year.
Increases in average labor productivity are typically interpreted as being due to increases in capital per hour at work (capital deepening), scale economies, and/or advances in the state of technical knowledge (such as, perhaps, learning which occurs after labor intensive tasks are performed repetitively).
A final example of factor-specific productivity of special relevance here, commonly known as average energy productivity, Is defined as output divided by energy input, where the latter can be measured in a number of ways (such as, for example, ton-equivalents of coal or British thermal units These are but three examples of factor-specific productivity growth measures. One could, of course, think of other inputs and then compute their average productivity growth rates. Rather than doing that, however, I belive it is more useful to consider the determinants affecting growth rates of factorspecific productivities. Begin by simply dividing both sides of the production function (1) by X i , thereby obtaining
which indicates that growth in factor-specific productivity for the ith input generally depends on the levels of all n inputs, as well as advances in the state of technical knowledge. Alternatively, as long as firms minimize costs, one can employ the cost function notion and obtain optimal (cost-minimizing) input-output coefficients for each of the n inputs into production, invert them and obtain factor-specific productivity measures as Y/X i = h(P,P 2 .... Pn;Y;A).
Equation (4) highlights the fact that factor-specific productivity measures are dependent on, inter alia, the prices of the n inputs. This dependence is closely related to the notion of price elasticity of demand. In particular, consider the following experiment: Suppose the price of the jth input changes, all other input prices remain fixed, while the state of technology A and the level of output Y also remain fixed. By how much does the optimal (cost-minimizing) demand for the ith input change? n -2 (6)
One can easily show that the average productivity elasticity nij is simply the negative of the price elasticity cij, i.e. ilij = -cij"
Consider, for example, the fact that a number of econometric studies have shown that in many manufacturing processes, energy and labor are substitutable inputs. As the price of labor increases, ceteris paribus, firms substitute away from labor and towards energy; this implies that the price elasticity CEL > 0
(where E is energy and L is labor). This energy-labor substitutability also implies that the average energy productivity elasticity with respect to labor is negative, i.e. nEL < 0; increases in the price of labor, ceteris paribus, induce substitution away from labor (increasing Y/L) and towards energy (thereby decreasing the average energy productivity Y/E).
While factor-specific average productivity measures contain useful summary information, they are subject to one very serious objection. Namely, it is not at all clear that increases in factor-specific average productivity are always desirable.2 Consider, for example, average labor productivity. As capital machines initially substituted for labor, Y/L increased. This capital-labor substitution could conceivably continue virtually forever, until finally a given level of output could be produced with but one unit of labor and an incredibly complex and expensive network of robots, computers and machines. While this extremely high level of Y/L might be possible in an engineering sense, it could also be very expensive --the combined capital and labor costs in such a low labor, high capital-intensive setting could be much higher than if more labor and less capital were employed. Similarly, one might in fact be able to build "super machines" that were incredibly energy efficient (near the limits implied by the laws of thermodynamics), but the combined energy and capital costs of operating such energy efficient machines might be considerably larger than if less energy-efficient designs were employed instead.
These two examples highlight the important economic fact that firms, households and societies are not necessarily better off simply because the factor-specific productivity of some input has increased; the consumption of other inputs may have increased as a result, and thus the total resource costs to society might be larger, the same as, or less than before. What is needed is a measure of productivity growth that recognizes the fact that all inputs are scarce, and that the desired productivity growth is that growth which results from the combined savings over all inputs, not just one input.
This consideration has led to the notion of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth, defined as growth in output minus growth in aggregate input, i.e.
where growth in aggregate input is a weighted sum of growth in the individual inputs, i.e.
with the wi weights being cost shares of the ith input in total costs of production.
Unlike factor-specific productivity measures, increases in MFP growth are always desirable, for they indicate that more output is being obtained from a given bundle of inputs. Due in large part to this clearer interpretation, major national statistical agencies, such as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, are now calculating and publishing measures of MFP growth on a regular basis.
While MFP growth measures are therefore in theory clearly preferable to factor-specific productivity growth measures, in practice the measurement of MFP growth requires more data than factor-specific productivity --price and quantity measures of all inputs are necessary. In this context, it is important to recognize that the calculated MFP residual in (8) may in fact reflect not only the effects of advances in the state of knowledge, but also a host of measurement errors.
II.C. Embodied and Disembodied Technical Progress
In the previous paragraphs I have presented alternative measures of productivity growth, and have argued that for most purposes the MFP growth measure is preferable to single-factor measures. This raises the next important issue: How are various types of advances in knowledge related to MFP growth?
Over the last few decades an extensive literature has developed in economics and economic history concerning the classification of technical progress. One important distinction frequently made is that between embodied and disembodied technical progress. is perhaps the notion of learning curves, in which it has been found that for a wide variety of production processes and products, as cumulative experience and production increase, learning occurs which results in ever decreasing unit costs. Some have called this type of learning process "learning by doing,"
"learning through the examples of others," or "learning by using." Classic examples include the production of aircraft frames and ships during World War II. 4 While the distinction between embodied and disembodied technical progress is in principle quite clear, in practice and in history one frequently finds that these two types of technical progress interact with one another in a complex and dynamic manner. This will be discussed further in Section III.A.
II.D. A Brief Summary of the Principal Recent Empirical Findings on Multifactor Productivity Growth
A great deal of literature has appeared in the last twenty years concerning abrupt changes in multifactor (MFP), labor and energy productivity A third significant set of findings is that measures of MFP growth depend critically on how one adjusts the inputs for quality change, and how one also adjusts for short-run cyclical changes in capacity utilization. Either of these adjustments can be decisive.
A fourth key finding in the empirical literature to date is that gains in energy conservation --increases in average energy productivity --typically followed the energy price shocks with a considerable time lag, and accelerated only after substantial investment occurred. This result simply reflects the fact that major changes in energy use patterns can occur only as the capital stock is replaced with more energy-efficient capital.
-Page 10 -Fifth, data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics show a resurgence in the growth rates of labor and multifactor productivity beginning in 1983, particularly in the manufacturing sector. 6 Note that in about 1983 in the US, real energy prices again began to fall.
Sixth and finally, the time patterns of labor, energy and multifactor productivity growth have differed considerably over the last twenty years, both within and among the various sectors of the OECD economies. An important implication of this, therefore, is that one must be careful and precise before talking about "the" productivity growth slowdown.
Having presented the economic framework in which technical progress and various types of productivity growth can be considered, and having very briefly reviewed the principal empirical evidence to date, I now focus on energy consumption and turn to an examination of interactions among energy use, technical progress and productivity growth.
III. ENERGY USE, TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
In this section I focus on the important role of energy use in interacting with technical progress and productivity growth. I will attempt to demonstrate the insights one can obtain from the economic framework reviewed in the previous pages. Four examples will be given, each of which in one way or another illustrates the importance of embodied and disembodied technical progress.
III.A. THE SCHURR HYPOTHESIS: AN EXAMPLE OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EMBODIED AND DISEMBODIED TECHNICAL PROGRESS
In a series of studies beginning in the early 1950's, Sam Schurr and his associates have hypothesized that the electrification of US industry in the early twentieth century contributed significantly both to labor and MFP growth. 7 This hypothesis is of special interest to productivity analysts, for it implies that even if labor and electricity were substitutable inputs in production (recall the discussion in Section II.B above), increases in electrification still resulted in both enhanced labor and MFP growth, i.e. the technical progress effects dominated the substitution effects.
The Schurr hypothesis in fact incorporates several hypotheses concerning the distinct and interactive contributions of electrification to productivity growth via embodied and disembodied technical progress. In essence it portrays the interaction between one type of energy having a special flexible form --electricity --and the introduction and adoption of new capital equipment and machinery driven by this new energy form.
More specifically, at the turn of the century electricity and the fluid fuels came into increasing use, due in large part to their relative abundance, their low prices, and their flexibility property relative to the solid fuels that had previously dominated energy supply. In the case of electricity, technical progress was embodied in the sense that low-cost electricity was now available from more efficient steam generation, and no longer required access to water wheels and running water.
In turn, these characteristics of electricity --low cost, abundance and enhanced flexibility in use --provided the seeds for the discovery, development and use of new product innovations. According to the historical literature, these advances in technical knowledge eventually led to the design and introduction of new "group drive" and ultimately "unit drive" machinery and equipment, thereby rationalizing the factory floor and inducing additional process innovations. In particular, the factory floors could now be laid out in a more logical, natural manner, using perhaps the new scientific management principles of Frederick Taylor, rather than being physically constrained by systems of belts and shafts. This demonstrates the interactive and dynamic nature of embodied and disembodied technical progress, and between product and process innovations.
One other feature of the Schurr hypothesis that has not received much attention is the important role of market structure in facilitating the diffusion of technical progress. In particular, electricity generating companies early on discovered the importance of scale economies, and this created possibilities for natural monopoly. Had natural monopolies been permitted to operate without any interference, the prices charged by the monopolies could have exceeded production costs and thereby could have slowed down the diffusion process considerably. What actually happened, of course, is that rather early in their history these electricity generating companies were regulated, prices were set so that economic profits were approximately zero, and promotional pricing strategies and policies were adopted that resulted in low electricity prices and rapid diffusion.
As a final comment, it is worth noting that the Schurr hypothesis has been implemented and assessed using econometric methods. In particular, based on pooled cross-section and time series data by state from the 1909, 1914 and 1919 censuses in the U.S., Berndt and Wood [1984b] have quantified the effects of electrification in the total manufacturing and cotton goods industries. Among their findings is the result that already in the 1909-1919 time period, prior to the very rapid increase in electrification, variations among states in overall horsepower and, more importantly, their electrified horsepower per unit of capital, had important and positive labor productivity effects, over and above the additional costs incurred by the manufacturing and cotton goods firms in -Page 13 -purchasing such equipment. Related econometric findings on the Schurr hypothesis have also been reported by Woolf [1980 Woolf [ ,1983 Woolf [ ,1984 and Berndt [1986] .
III.B. THE BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE HYPOTHESIS: DISEMBODIED TECHNICAL PROGRESS
A rather different body of literature indicating a special role for both electric and non-electric energy inputs in the productivity growth process has appeared in the last decade, and is typically referred to as the biased technical change hypothesis. Its principal spokesman has been Dale W. Based on annual US data since 1958, Jorgenson obtains the striking finding that in almost every one of the 35 sectors examined, the estimated parameter on the time variable in the energy cost share demand equations is positive. This implies that technical progress is energy using.
Before proceeding further, I believe it may be useful to provide some interpretation on what is meant by input-using or input-saving technical progress. When technical progress occurs, the same amount of output can now be produced using fewer total inputs. The proportional savings on some inputs, -Page 14 -however, might be larger than for other inputs. Technical progress is said to be input i-using (input i-saving) if the proportional savings on the ith input is less than (greater than) the average proportional savings over all inputs, respectively. Finally, technical progress is said to be input i-neutral if the proportional savings on the ith input just equals the average proportional savings over all inputs. Since the estimated coefficient on the time variable in most of Jorgenson's energy cost share demand equations was positive, this implied that technical progress was energy-using.
Although the intuition is not completely obvious, it turns out that when technical progress is input i-using (i-saving), increases in the relative price of the ith input result in a lower (higher) rate of multifactor productivity The stylized fact taught in most economics courses was that about 10% of growth in output was due to growth in input, and the remaining 90% was unexplained and therefore thought to be due to technical progress.
In a pioneering article, Dale Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches [1967] challenged this conventional wisdom, arguing that previous analysts failed to account properly for input quality changes. More specifically, they first argued that labor input had changed considerably over time, for by the late 1960's the average worker was more highly educated and more productive than he/she was two decades earlier. The result of these two input quality adjustments on the measurement of the role of MFP growth was enormous. Although some controversy ensued, by the early 1970's it had become clear that for the US since World War II, about 50%
(rather than 10%) of growth in output was due to growth in input, and the remaining 50% (rather than 90%) was due to disembodied technical progress.
While the above discussion is of interest, the reader may wonder what its relationship is to energy usage. As I shall now argue, the issues underlying "The composition of the labor force has changed, and so has the composition of the fuel and power basket. Workers are, in general, better educated, and, similarly, certain energy commodities in use today are an improvement over those used seventy-five years ago (a kilowatt hour is, in this sense, a pound of coal with a college education)." Schurr-Netschert [1960] , p. 173.
There is of course a long literature on measuring the quality of energy, where quality has a clear thermodynamic foundation involving its availability to do work. Within that literature, it is well-known that electricity has a very high quality. Following Schurr-Netschert, here I will use the phrase "energy quality" in a more general manner, and simply note that this usage is not inconsistent with the implications of thermodynamics.
In essence, the changing composition of energy toward electricity and away from first the solid fuels, and more recently, the liquid fuels, implies that the average quality of aggregate energy has improved over time, and that this quality change should be incorporated into MFP growth calculations. One possible way of doing this, which may elicit sympathy from some engineers, is to compute an aggregate measure for energy in which electricity is weighted by the average number of British thermal units used to generate a kilowatt hour. If this were done, electricity input today would be weighted by approximately 10,000 Btu's per kilowatt hour, instead of the common 3412 Btu's per kilowatt hour procedure based on their mechanical equivalence; for periods earlier in this century when electricity generation was less efficient, the weight would be approximately 20,000 Btu's per kilowatt hour. One problem with such a procedure is that it does not really deal well with electricity generated by hydropower or nuclear energy. A preferable procedure, and significantly, one based very firmly in the economic theory of index numbers, is to weight the various types of energy by their prices, for in this way their marginal value to users is quantified.13
In order to obtain a quantitative notion of how important it is to quality-adjust energy input, in Table 1 below I present several alternative measures of energy input in the manufacturing sectors of the U.S. and Japan.
These figures are taken from Berndt, Sagawa, Sawa and Wood (1986] .
As seen in the columns with the heading "Physical Energy Intensity"
(defined as a Btu measure of aggregate energy divided by real output, and manufacturing increased at an AAGR of 0.81%.
Once one properly accounts for the improved energy quality, therefore, the apparent gains in energy conservation for the U.S. are not as large as commonly stated. This is not to be interpreted negatively, but simply indicates that manufacturing firms are increasingly turning toward the economically more efficient electricity and away from the liquid fuels. In the US, for example, the economic energy intensity (or, quality-adjusted energy intensity) declined 0.21% from 1965 to 1973, and then dropped much more sharply with an AAGR of 2.53% from 1974 to 1981. Over the entire 1965-81 time perJod, average energy intensity adjusted for quality change dropped at an AAGR of 1.17%. What this implies, therefore, is that about 40% of the apparent gains in energy conservation since 1965 in the U.S. are in fact due to improvements in energy quality. however, the physical energy intensity fell at a rate of slightly larger than 5%
per year, compared with the 3.7% rate of decrease in the U.S. This 5% drop per year in physical energy intensity continued in Japan through 1982 and 1983.
While the physical energy intensity measure is of interest, as noted earlier it masks important compositional changes in energy consumption that affect aggregate energy quality. In Japan, interestingly, average energy quality actually dropped from 1965 to 1973 (unlike the US), but since 1974 the role of energy quality changes has been almost identical in Japan and the US.
Specifically, for Japan over the 1974--81 time period, while physical energy intensity dropped at an AAGR of 5.08%, energy quality increased at an AAGR of 1.59%, implying that the economic energy intensity fell at approximately 3.58% per year. Hence for Japan, energy quality improvements resulted in about a 33% reduction in apparent energy conservation gains (the latter based on physical weights). For the US, the corresponding growth rates during the same 1974-81 time period are -3.70% for physical energy intensity, 1.23% for energy quality increases, and -2.53% for economic energy intensity. This implies that since 1974 in the US, as in Japan, the relative role of energy quality improvements was about 33% --improvements in energy quality reduced apparent energy conservation gains by about one-third. Notice also that for Japan, in the last two years of the sample (1982-83) the energy quality proportion increases to over 50%.
In summary, therefore, the changing composition of energy inputs in the manufacturing sectors of the US and Japan toward electricity and away from the liquid fuels has resulted in an increase in the average quality of the aggregate energy input. This more effective, more productive aggregate energy input should be properly accounted for when undertaking average energy and MFP growth calculations.
III.D. ENERGY PRICE SHOCKS AND THE QUALITY OF CAPITAL: MEASUREMENT ISSUES
The fourth and final example of the special relationship among energy usage, technical progress and productivity growth concerns the impacts of unexpected energy price changes. Essentially, the argument here is that when In the short-run, the services available from capital equipment are largely fixed, and so too are the operating characteristics of the equipment.
Although considerable energy-capital substitutability is possible ex ante, once capital is put into place the ratio of energy consumption to capital services actually utilized is fixed. The relationship between energy and utilized capital services is then one of putty-clay --malleable ex ante, fixed ex post.
This ex post fixity is extremely important, for it implies that when firms make decisions concerning the optimal energy efficiency for long-lived capital IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS In this paper I have attempted to survey and interpret several of the most important economic aspects underlying the relationships among technical progress, productivity growth and energy use. I began by focusing on the economic theory of cost and production, distinguished factor-specific from MFP growth, and embodied from disembodied technical progress.
I then briefly summarized the most salient empirical regularities of the last few decades, and noted in particular that quite frequently the factorspecific and MFP growth measures moved in different ways, implying that one should be cautious about talking about "the" productivity growth slowdown.
-Page 24 -
In the second half of the paper, I focused on the special role of energy consumption in inducing and reflecting the effects of technical progress and productivity growth. Four examples were chosen to highlight the special role of energy: (i) the Schurr electrification hypothesis, which dramatizes the interactive nature of embodied and disembodied technical progress; (ii) the biased technical change hypothesis, which depends critically on disembodied technical progress, but whose underlying engineering interpretation is not yet clear; (iii) the energy quality issue, which highlights the fact that not all British thermal units are identical, and that the changing composition of energy towards electricity in the last few decades implies that physical measures ofý aggregate energy input should be adjusted for quality change; and (iv), the energy price-induced change in utilization of capital plant and equipment issue.
which points to the importance of the fixity of capital plant and equipment, and tends to result in overstatements of the MFP growth slowdown after 1973.
While the four examples are varied, they contain a common theme which is worth noting once again. In thinking about relationships among energy usage, technical progress and productivity growth, I believe three concepts are indispensable: embodiment, diffusion and learning. It is an understatement to note that economists do not have an intellectual monopoly on these concepts.
While economic thinking can contribute significantly to understanding the forces linking energy usage, technical progress and productivity growth, economists have a great deal to learn from colleagues in the engineering and physical sciences, from those in other social sciences, and from historians.
framework was the first to do so in a symmetric manner for all inputs, within a consistent and rigorous theoretical framework based on the theory of cost and production.
1 2 A major problem in measuring quality changes in capital input lie with the official government deflators used to measure real investment. For further discussion, see Griliches [1971] , chapter 4 in Berndt [1990] , as well as Gordon [1990] .
131ndex number issues, with particular emphasis on energy, are discussed in detail in Berndt [1978] . For a related application, see Marlay [1984] .
1 4 This argument has been called by some the "Baily hypothesis" (see Baily [1981] ), and is presented in greater detail in Berndt-Wood [1984 ,1986a .
15In contrast to this short-run relationship between energy price shocks and measured capital input, a longer term relationship between energy prices and multifactor productivity involves energy-capital complementarity, in which energy price changes are found to reduce demands for both energy and capital.
To the extent this is true and to the extent that new investment goods are the carriers of technical progress (due to embodiment), energy price increases could in the long run reduce the rate of MFP growth. Empirical evidence on the energy-capital complementarity hypothesis, and its implications for longrun productivity growth, is found in Berndt-Wood [1986a,b] .
1 6 A closely related issue concerns the effects of energy price shocks on the depreciation patterns and second-hand values of energy-using equipment with fixed energy efficiencies. Using data on various types of second-hand transactions for energy-using equipment, Hulten, Robertson and Wykoff [19891 find that energy price shocks had only a very small impact on the depreciation patterns and prices of such energy-using equipment.
